

be Sayers' most important premise: This threefold reality is to be found in every man and woman—and that, therefore, her theology of work has profound implications for education; for employment; and, indeed, for the entire spectrum of economic and political life. Fletcher points out that Sayers is asking us if it cannot be argued that “in confining most people to uncreative activities and an uncreative outlook, we are not doing violence to their very nature.” Not only does work take on real theological and anthropological significance in Sayers' account, but also Fletcher highlights her argument that this understanding of work can only lead to the conclusion that work supersedes the value placed on leisure, which has historically been the aim of educated persons.

In the last section of the book, Fletcher argues that Alasdair MacIntyre's concepts of a *practice* in *After Virtue* and of *human development* in *Dependent Rational Animals* serve to complete Sayers' account of human work, an important and interesting analysis of the convergence between these two thinkers. Fletcher shows that, when taken together, their work constitutes a vision of the significance of human work and of the practice of virtue required to do it well. Such a vision is precisely what those interested in achieving a morally grounded marketplace need to embrace.

However, though Catholic social teaching is given brief mention in the text, notably missing from Fletcher's treatment is any inclusion of Pope John Paul II's profound contribution on the meaning of work found in *Laborem Exercens*. This seems a strange oversight, given its startling congruence with Sayers' own theory and in light of Professor Fletcher's likely familiarity with Catholic social thought. Also missing is any connection with Josef Pieper's thinking in *Leisure as the Basis of Culture*, something that would have served to support Sayers' exploration of the relationship between work and leisure. Perhaps these links can be explored in future research.

It remains true nonetheless that Christine Fletcher's effort to retrieve the work of Dorothy Sayers is of real benefit to all those looking for a coherent account of how to go about making life more human for all. Dorothy Sayers was indeed a prophet, and *The Artist and the Trinity* is an important contribution to the recovery of her voice.

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Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity

Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann (editors)
New York: Springer, 2014 (223 pages)

The most popular political versions of liberal individualism and collectivism agree on a negative concept of man: They see him mainly as motivated by low-down and short-term desires. Most liberal individualists call this human nature and propose the free market as a way to turn those private vices into public benefits. Most collectivists, on the other hand, believe that human nature does not exist, and that we could transform our so-called nature by changing social institutions using the central power of the state.

In the West, the political regimes that emerged out of the Cold War are a combination of state protection and free market. These regimes are built over the anthropological consensus of the past century. Their purpose is to administrate human life by posing “the right incentives in the right places” and extending the sphere of individual autonomy as much as possible. The combination of economic growth, globalization, and the extension of individual autonomy is called *progress*. Modern political disagreements are about the best combination of market and state to achieve and manage that progress.

History has not ended. As societies change, new ethical and practical problems arise, and some of them can be solved by neither the free market nor the state. They cannot be addressed by a concept of the human person as *homo economicus*. The dead ends of the old order are becoming apparent. Local communities challenge the authority of states and companies, social movements emerge and established political powers cannot understand what they want, international conflicts cast a shadow on globalization, and civil society seems to be back in the game as a relevant political player. It is in this context that the dispute about who has the authority to decide what in which circumstances becomes crucial. That, then, is the reason why we will hear more about the principle of subsidiarity.

The principle of subsidiarity proposes a set of criteria to know who must be responsible for what in which circumstances. There are many versions of the principle, but at its core is the idea of the due respect for the relative autonomy of all social organizations, and of trust in the human capacity for associating with others to solve common social problems. Its most popular version is the one developed by Catholic social doctrine, but there are also variations of this idea in Protestant thought, as well as in the classical liberal tradition. The principle is invoked often in legal documents. Nevertheless, there is a lack of academic reflection on subsidiarity and its relevance for our times. This deficit is the one that *Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity*, edited by Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann, intends to remediate.

The book is divided into eleven chapters and an editor’s conclusion. The first five chapters deal with the definition of subsidiarity. Looking for the roots of the concept, Nicholas Aroney takes us to Aristotle and his idea of the *Polis* as comprised of households and villages, making clear that this notion almost disappears in Aristotle’s treatment of the government of the city-state. It is in the work of Thomas Aquinas that the concept of subsidiarity emerges as requiring respect for the diversity of functionally differentiated jurisdictions that exist in one social order. These jurisdictions are structured hierarchically, but this hierarchy does not give to the higher orders unlimited authority over the lower ones. There is a unity of order in society but more than one center of authority: The common good can only be reached if civil associations collaborate among one another to reach their ends but not if they fight to absorb the functions of the other associations.

The germ of the modern doctrine of subsidiarity is, then, in Thomas Aquinas. However, its development in the social doctrine of the Catholic Church starts only in the nineteenth century. Before that, in the sixteenth century, it is Althusius, a Calvinist theologian, who advances this idea with the development of the early elements of the notion of “sphere sovereignty”—a nonhierarchical differentiation of spheres of power among diverse so-

cial organizations. This idea breaks with the hierarchical notion of subsidiarity found in Aquinas and leads to a different tradition of social and political thinking.

The reaction of the Catholic Church in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the rise of revolutionary ideologies that promote radical social change imposed from the state will lead to the development of the social doctrine of the Church. Additionally, one of the pillars of that doctrine will be the principle of subsidiarity. This process is insightfully explained in Patrick McKinley's chapter, which starts with the doctrinal work of Popes Pius IX and Leo XIII. The idea of subsidiarity is already present in the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891), but the first explicit elaboration of the concept is in *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931)—one of the most relevant encyclicals of Pope Pius XI. Later popes such as Pius XII, John XXIII, John Paul II, and Benedict XVI would also use this concept in various encyclicals.

Meanwhile, the Protestant idea of subsidiarity as sphere sovereignty was developed as a justification for the separation of church and state in the nineteenth century by the Dutch conservative politician Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer, the theologian Abraham Kuyper, and the legal philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd. The similarities and differences between sphere sovereignty and Catholic subsidiarity are well explained by Lael Weinberger.

The secular application of Catholic and Protestant ideas about subsidiarity leads to diverging political doctrines about the concept. Some thinkers link it with federalism, others with liberal contractualism, and others with libertarianism. Subsidiarity has also been related to such concepts as the division of powers, limited government, and social pluralism. These concepts, in turn, have had decisive influence on the legal systems and the constitutions of many countries in the last half of the twentieth century.

This relationship of subsidiarity and national legal systems is discussed in the last six chapters of the book. Three of them analyze the influence (or lack thereof) of the subsidiarity principle in the constitutions of Brazil (Augusto Zimmermann), Australia (Michelle Evans), and Germany (Jürgen Bröhmer). Then, a chapter deals with subsidiarity as a principle of judicial and legislative review in the European Union (Gabriel Moens and John Trone). The link between subsidiarity and national systems of social protection is masterfully addressed by Robert Sirico, and the role of subsidiarity in the global order is discussed, in the final chapter of the book, by Andreas Follesdal.

Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity offers us a panoramic view of this idea, of its applications, and of the wide array of ideas to which it is related. It is, then, a starting point to appreciate the strength of this idea and a call for attention to the lack of importance that it has had in our public and academic debate until now.

The most valuable aspect of this book is that it provides concise concepts and vocabulary to think and speak about the political conflicts of the modern world from a fresh perspective. It has this potential because the perspective of subsidiarity—in any of its formulations—is grounded on a concept of man and society that is different from the one that has been dominant since the Cold War. It sees the human person as capable of action beyond his immediate interests and society as a polyphony of different organizations with different ends. Therefore, subsidiarity breaks with both the ideologies that confuse society with the market as well as with those that confuse it with the state.

This vocabulary brings new meaning to concepts such as *solidarity*, *pluralism*, and *responsibility* and allows the reader to think of answers to contemporary conflicts of authority from outside the logic that generated those disputes in the first place. It also allows us to think about power and the risks of a monocentric society, as opposed to a polycentric one. In other words, this book is a great first step into the questions that will likely shape our political future.

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