

Conklin persuasively argues that the Founding generation understood the “pursuit of happiness” to include a broad understanding of human flourishing. Modern scholars often see a fundamental conflict between Lockean ideals and expectations of virtue, but as Conklin notes, the Founders did not. They could argue for Lockean property rights while simultaneously appreciating the necessity of duties.

This book could serve undergraduate students studying the Founders’ thought. However, faculty should also introduce students to the debates over how the Founders understood Locke and whether they correctly interpreted him. Among the many relevant scholars are Jeremy Waldron, Michael Zuckert, and Thomas G. West. Blackstone might have been swimming in the same intellectual currents as the Founders but the Founders heavily relied on Locke.

Other than perhaps Ethan Allen, the Founders were not libertarians. However, they also stressed the importance of individual property rights to an extent that would make committed communitarians uncomfortable. That tension between individual property rights and expectations of duties has been and remains at the heart of America’s republican experiment.

Conklin concludes her book by correctly noting that the Founders believed “that, as humans, we were created to live, at liberty, with the unalienable right to engage in the pursuit [of happiness].” Today’s academic institutions seem committed to actively forgetting these national first principles. To her credit, Conklin reminds us of the importance of our rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

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**Religion and Comparative Development:  
The Genesis of Democracy and Dictatorship**  
**Theocharis Grigoriadis**  
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018 (202 pages)

This is an ambitious work, attempting to set out “the first comparative theory of religion and political development” through an examination of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and Judaism (xi). To accomplish such a challenging goal in such a comparatively brief work, Grigoriadis first provides a political theory of religion, asserting that it is “more structure than ethics.” The theory yields three “grand themes”: (1) religion shapes the electorate’s social welfare expectations and the bureaucracy’s surveillance incentives and collectivist distribution approach; (2) the organizational structures of religions shape the administrative structures of local and regional communities; and (3) these influences combine to influence the degree to which a society is collectivist or individualistic (10, 18–19). Spoiler alert: This is not particularly good news for everyone but Protestants. The Eastern Orthodox get public sector oligarchies, the Catholics get state corporations or clientelism, the Jews get fragmented democracy, and the Protestants get liberal or social democracy (19–20).

Roughly the first quarter of the book is devoted to developing the theoretical framework. The argument is a model of good social science—it incorporates game theory (with formal modeling), careful observation of Orthodox monasticism and Israeli local governments, history, and theology. While this section will be daunting reading for those not familiar with game theory, the basic argument is set out clearly and concisely and so the nontechnical reader will be able to grasp the key points. This is followed by a somewhat longer section attempting a statistical test of the model's predictions using data from public opinion surveys in Russian and Israeli cities. While I applaud the effort to test the theory, and Grigoriadis gets as much from his data as anyone could expect and uses appropriate technical methods to do so, I was left skeptical of whether a public opinion survey is a reliable basis for his conclusions. For example, one important conclusion is that “central religious institutions for Russian Orthodoxy and Judaism in Russia and Israel, respectively, have boosted positive evaluations of government at both central and local levels” (85). Grigoriadis' results are certainly not inconsistent with his theoretical claim, but the close relationships between the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Israeli state and the more conservative variants of Judaism via the participation of various religious parties in the Israeli government, offer an alternative explanation of such preferences' correlations with support for governments.

The final third of the book is where Grigoriadis's analysis really shines. Here he undertakes a detailed analysis of the political economy of Russian Orthodoxy, diving into theology, church history, economic and political theory, and game theory. Again, Grigoriadis undertakes to test his theory, this time via a public goods allocation experiment involving bureaucrats from two cities in Siberia. The results were consistent with his hypothesis that the principles of Orthodox monasticism are reflected in Russian administrative structures and public goods provision. Grigoriadis concludes that the norms of Orthodox monasticism and post-Soviet bureaucracy are related. This in turn yields recommendations for policy, including that Orthodox countries should focus anti-corruption efforts on lower rather than higher hierarchical levels, while Protestant countries should do the reverse.

Finally, Grigoriadis generalizes his analysis within the broader Weberian tradition through a game theoretic analysis of Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* between 1871 and 1878, in which the Chancellor attempted to reduce the role of the Catholic Church in Prussia. Grigoriadis's “secularization game” yields the result that collectivist priests must be recruited through repression while individualist priests can be recruited with individual payoffs. Since Grigoriadis links Catholic theology to a collectivist outlook, he explains why Bismarck struggled to contain political Catholicism.

In *Religion and Comparative Development*, Grigoriadis has provided a thoughtful analysis that suggests how theology influences the structure of states generally and the means by which they provide public goods in particular. This is fertile soil for investigation and I hope we see further development and testing of Grigoriadis's particular hypotheses and the broader conceptual framework. Further, the book is a model of careful social science, combining deep knowledge of relevant literatures from outside economics and

political science, thoughtful development of formal models which yield testable hypotheses, and well-designed efforts to carry out those tests with the best evidence available.

The book is also commendable for its efforts to expand its examination of religion's role in politics and economics beyond the usual Catholic/Protestant and European examples. In particular, Grigoriadis's exploration of the diversity of religious views in Israel is a good example of taking advantage of a natural experiment and his in-depth analysis of the connections between Orthodox monasticism and post-Soviet Russian political organization is both original and insightful. These are topics that merit further development, and I hope that both Grigoriadis and others will extend the book's analysis in both these areas.

The book's use of game theory and statistical analysis may put off some potential readers, who may blanch at the math. The most technical material is carefully segregated into appendices and Grigoriadis does a fine job of presenting his results clearly and with minimal reliance on technical jargon so that readers less familiar with both can still profit from reading the other parts of the book. It would be a great pity if Grigoriadis's careful social science approach prevented the book from sparking a conversation within the Orthodox world over the church's relationship to the state. This conversation needs to go beyond the relationships between churches and the Syrian and Russian states in particular (although those are surely important). What Grigoriadis demonstrates is that theology has consequences for how states are organized and what policies are likely to be effective, which implies that religious authorities need to consider their responsibility for those consequences.

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## The Ethics of Competition: How a Competitive Society Is Good for All

**Christoph Lütge**  
Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019 (221 pages)

The ethical dimension of competition is not a novelty. The well-known economist Frank Hyneman Knight wrote an essay with the title "Ethics of Competition" (*Quarterly Journal of Economics* 37 [August 1923]: 579–624; reprinted by Routledge in 2014 together with other essays and an introduction). However, this new book is innovative in its focus and in explaining how competition and ethics can be related. Its understanding of competition—unlike Knight, not reduced to the marketplace and the material satisfaction of needs—is also interesting.

The author, Christoph Lütge, is Full Professor of Business Ethics at Technische Universität München (TUM) and has recently been appointed Director of the TUM Institute for Ethics in Artificial Intelligence. He is well-known in the field of business