

Readers looking for a work that details the involvement of the average citizen in charitable causes and social work should look elsewhere. While the importance of the ordinary American to the philanthropic movement is frequently emphasized, the story as told by Zunz focuses on the interaction of the wealthy and the government. This fact is not a negative reflection on the book but simply an observation that his material and the story of philanthropic foundations have their own naturally imposed limits. However, those wanting to know how modern philanthropy has shaped the lives of American citizens will want to start with Zunz's work before pursuing more detailed study of particular movements and causes.

—Jonathan Newell

Southern New Hampshire University, Manchester, New Hampshire

The Ethics of Trade and Aid: Development, Charity or Waste?

Christopher D. Wraight

London, United Kingdom: Continuum, 2011 (178 pages)

This is a very well-written book, which will be helpful for anybody interested in the philosophy and economics of foreign aid and trade. Through no fault of the author, the presentation from a publishing point of view is not very exciting, but this should not stop the interested reader from purchasing the book, especially given that the paperback is a very reasonable price.

The author, a philosopher who teaches at the Royal Institute of Philosophy, starts by looking at why the world is so unequal. The style is engaging, with anecdotes such as the difficulty of domesticating zebras being used to illustrate the point that chance has had much to do with whether countries become rich or poor. Colonization is also blamed for the problems of poor countries. Arguably, too much weight is given to this as well as to luck and not enough to good policy when discussing the determinants of economic success. The author does not ask, for example, why Singapore is much richer than Kenya (both colonies). He does not ask why Ethiopia is much poorer than Canada (the former was not a colony except for a very short period, the latter was). Poverty does not just afflict countries that have been colonies together with countries afflicted by bad luck. Poor policy and human error have a large part to play. As such, I would argue that far too little attention is given to the institutions of property rights, the rule of law, and so on, in promoting prosperity. Never does the author give the impression of being anything other than dispassionate in his discussion, and he is generous to all authors of all points of view.

Wraight then looks in detail at different philosophical perspectives that might justify development aid. The discussion of philosophy is very effective and well illustrated with analogies. Oddly, the author does not examine perspectives grounded in a Christian morality based on intrinsic human rights and the dignity of the human person. This is particularly

interesting given the huge involvement of Christian groups in providing charity for poor countries and, rightly or wrongly, in campaigning for more government aid.

Wraight then examines the practical record of foreign aid. Again, it is a pretty dispassionate analysis, yet there are some flaws in the reasoning. Wraight points out that William Easterly claims that bad governance is the major cause of poverty but then uses China as a counterargument, which he mentions is not a democracy and yet is, according to Wraight, rich. First, good governance and democracy are not synonymous—as Hong Kong shows. Second, China is not rich—it is merely growing rapidly out of desperate poverty. Ultimately, the author reaches a balanced conclusion suggesting that it would be unreasonable to argue that all aid is good and ought to be supported or that all aid is bad and ought to be outlawed. He does miss a crucial argument (surprisingly for a philosopher), however. What if we only know whether aid has done good (or bad) things *ex post*? In other words, what if we only know “what works” (if that is our criterion) in retrospect? If this is the case, then we have to make a judgment *ex ante* and some might conclude, as Bauer did, that, because the risks of failed aid were so great and the benefits from aid so marginal, we should not go ahead and provide government-to-government aid. Of course, others might conclude that aid should go ahead, whilst also accepting the impossibility of making a well-founded *ex ante* judgment about the likely success of aid.

It is also notable that effective distinctions between aid and charity are not made. Perhaps this reflects the author’s philosophical position. Interestingly, Wraight is critical of the emphasis on celebrity campaigns for foreign aid on the ground that they raise expectations and therefore lead people to be skeptical even when aid does some limited good.

The author completes the analysis with some reflections on trade. This is a somewhat odd chapter from the economist’s point of view. It is implied that the West keeps trade barriers to benefit their industries whilst lecturing poor countries about removing their barriers. Protectionist barriers harm the country that imposes them. Poor countries that have opened themselves up to trade have grown more rapidly than those that have not. The so-called Washington consensus of price control removal, privatization, and so on, is also criticized for sending living standards plummeting in the post-communist Soviet Union. This is a gross simplification. I wonder if the author would prefer to live in Poland or Romania, or whether he would prefer to live in the Czech Republic or the Ukraine. The first of each pair liberalized more quickly than the other. Countries that liberalized rapidly tended to prosper most. The institutional background was such that any approach to liberalization was going to bring suffering—but nothing like the suffering from continuing with the status quo. Indeed, oddly—though correctly—the author then almost demolishes his own arguments against removing trade restrictions in poor countries in the following pages by arguing very effectively against both the economic and political-economic consequences of trade barriers. Once again, the reader gets both sides of the argument, though the critique of the so-called Washington consensus should be more qualified.

The author concludes, correctly, that rich countries should reduce their tariff barriers, though perhaps the description of the damage that Western trade barriers cause poor countries is rather exaggerated. Most of the barriers to development are home grown.

Nevertheless, there is a compelling moral and economic case for Western countries to do as Wraight suggests with regard to trade barriers on agricultural products.

All in all, the author has a good grasp of the wide range of disciplines necessary to analyze this topic from so many angles. It is a worthy addition to any Christian's reading list even though Christian approaches to philosophy are omitted.

—Philip Booth

Institute of Economic Affairs and Cass Business School, London, United Kingdom

Free Market Fairness

John Tomasi

Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012 (348 pages)

In *Free Market Fairness*, John Tomasi, professor of political science and philosophy at Brown University, embraces an ambitious agenda: reconciling the left liberal philosophy of social justice with libertarian and classical liberal views on the economic rights of capitalism. To this end, Tomasi introduces a liberal research program that he calls “market democracy,” a deliberative form of liberalism that reflects sensitivity to the moral insights of libertarianism. In his first two chapters, Tomasi discusses the origins of the conflict within liberal thinking between the classical liberalism and the high liberalism traditions.

In chapter 1, Tomasi reviews the classical liberal revolution through the seminal writings of John Locke's doctrine of self-ownership and the natural freedoms of all citizens; Adam Smith, whose “systems of natural liberty” limit government activity to national defense, the provision of a limited range of public goods, and the administration of justice; and others chronicling the early American experience, including the creation of a Constitution with enumerated powers balancing economic rights with civil and political rights. Tomasi concludes his review with F. A. Hayek's writings, whereby the protection of freedom (including the protection of property) and the achievement of economic efficiency are married to create an ideal of formal equality. Hayek's rules of property allow for the best use of local knowledge governed by the *nomos*, or “grown” law, that forms the basis of the spontaneous order of society at large, while rejecting public policy's pursuing social or distributive justice. From this rich classical liberal tradition, Tomasi summarizes three concepts: (1) a thick concept of economic liberty grounded mainly in consequentialist considerations, (2) a formal concept of equality that sees the outcome of free-market exchanges as largely definitive of justice, and (3) a limited but important state role in tax-funded education and social-service programs.

In chapter 2, Tomasi explores the development of a largely European project: high liberalism. Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that laws protecting economic liberty did not really protect people from domination, while Karl Marx posited that there are no legal guarantees that the liberal social world will not be marked by fixed, enduring class divisions based on people's standing in the economic order. Further, John Stuart Mill argued that progressive beings do not need economic liberty in order to “pursue their own good