The notion of subjectivism has a significant place in the body of economic theory, most notably in the theory of subjective value. There is, however, one concern that some philosophers have raised about truth in normative judgments that puts economic subjectivism seriously into question. This concern can be articulated as the following question: Is there truth regarding economic value judgments? The answer to this question is pertinent not only for an improved understanding of economic value theory but to such philosophical investigations as realism, epistemology, ontology, and ethics. Nonetheless, the answer is not readily available in the body of economic theory. The ensuing discussion will explore the issue of whether the truth of economic judgments can be settled objectively and, if so, how truth is made known.
Gloria L. Ziga, "Truth in Economic Subjectivism," Journal of Markets & Morality 1, no. 2 (October 1998): 158-168